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By Douglas E. Abrams
 On June 1, 2012, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit decided National As-
sociation of Regulatory Utility Commis-
sioners v. United States Department of 
Energy.1  The three-judge panel held that 
the challenged agency determination 
violated the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
of 1982.2  Without conducting a valid 
cost evaluation required by the Act, the 
agency had refused to adjust or suspend 
annual fees collected from owners and 
operators of nuclear power plants to 
cover costs of the government’s long-
term disposal of civilian nuclear waste.
 The parties hotly contested the case 
with servings of alphabet soup.  On page 
48 of its 58-page brief, for example, the 
Association argued: “Although DOE 
has not disclaimed its obligation to dis-
pose of SNF, it is undisputed that DOE 
currently has no active waste disposal 
program. . . . The BRC is undertaking 
none of the waste disposal program 
activities identified in NWPA § 302(d). 
Its existence therefore cannot justify 
continued NWF fee collection.”3
 On page 24 of its 60-page brief, 
the agency countered that “[t]he plain 
language of the NWPA . . . provides 
the Secretary [of Energy] with broad 
discretion in determining whether to 
recommend a change to the statutory 
NWF fee. . . . In section 302(a)(2) of the 
NWPA, Congress set the amount of the 
NWF fee – which is paid only by utili-
ties that enter into contracts with DOE 
for the disposal of their SNF and HLW. 
. . .”4 
 Get it?
Alphabet Soup
 The court’s opinion admonished the 
parties for “abandon[ing] any attempt 
to write in plain English, instead abbre-
viating every conceivable agency and 
statute involved, familiar or not, and 
littering their briefs with references to 
‘SNF,’ ‘HLW,’ ‘NWF,’ ‘NWPA,’ and 
‘BRC’ — shorthand for ‘spent nuclear 
fuel,’ ‘high-level radioactive waste,’ 
the ‘Nuclear Waste Fund,’ the ‘Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act,’ and the ‘Blue Ribbon 
Commission.’”5 
 Writing for the unanimous panel, 
Judge Laurence H. Silberman instructed 
that “[b]rief-writing, no less than ‘writ-
ten English, is full of bad habits which 
spread by imitation and which can be 
avoided if one is willing to take the 
necessary trouble.’”6  The D.C. Circuit’s 
Handbook of Practice and Internal 
Procedures flags the bad habit that oc-
casioned the court’s instruction here: 
“[P]arties are strongly urged to limit 
the use of acronyms. While acronyms 
may be used for entities and statutes 
with widely recognized initials, such as 
FERC and FOIA, parties should avoid 
using acronyms that are not widely 
known.”7
 The confusion created by the parties’ 
casual use of acronyms appeared par-
ticularly stark because Judge Silberman 
and his colleagues were not newcomers 
unaccustomed to the federal administra-
tive thicket.  The D.C. Circuit has been 
called “a de facto, quasi-specialized 
administrative law court”8 because it 
“has exclusive jurisdiction over a variety 
of challenges to administrative action 
and hears a disproportionate share of 
the United States’ administrative law 
cases.”9  The court’s “steady diet”10 of 
federal agency review proceedings in-
cludes ones involving the Department 
of Energy.  The three judges hearing the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act appeal had 
served an aggregate total of 59 years 
on the court.11
  
A Rule of Reason
 Lawyers’ use of acronyms should be 
guided by a “rule of reason” that, in the 
exercise of sound judgment, balances 
two threshold considerations. On the one 
hand, when an acronym recognizable 
by the intended audience is fully identi-
fied at its first appearance, the acronym 
can simplify the writer’s message and 
help readers move more easily from 
paragraph to paragraph.  On the other 
hand, as the D.C. Circuit intimates, an 
acronym concocted by the writer or 
otherwise unknown to most readers can 
impede that movement, even with initial 
full identification. 
 Timing and appreciation for a reader’s 
ordinary attention span may also matter. 
To be fair to the Association and the 
agency in the recent D.C. Circuit ap-
peal, the parties’ briefs did fully identify 
acronyms the first time they appeared. 
In any expositive writing, however, 
even apparently recognizable acronyms 
fully identified early can leave readers 
disoriented when the acronym does not 
appear again until several pages later 
(perhaps a dozen or more pages later in a 
brief, and even several dozen in a book). 
Rather than force readers to refresh their 
memories by scanning several prior 
pages to ferret out the full identification, 
the writer applying the rule of reason 
might be better off repeating the full 
name again.  
 In the recent appeal, for example, 
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the parties fully identified the “Nuclear 
Waste Fund (NWF)” on page 1 of their 
respective briefs.  Even if some readers 
might be familiar with the acronym, 
however, scrapping the shorthand by 
repeating the full name a dozen or more 
pages later would have better served 
the parties’ efforts to communicate ef-
fectively with the court. 
 These basic principles apply not only 
in briefs and other submissions written 
for courts, but also in articles, mono-
graphs, books and other publications 
written for a more general readership of 
lawyers or non-lawyers.
  
Submissions to Courts 
 Judges seasoned in administrative 
review decided the recent Nuclear Waste 
Policy Act appeal, but judges in general 
jurisdiction courts may not initially be as 
familiar as counsel with the substantive 
law that determines the outcome.  As 
American law has grown increasingly 
intricate and diverse in recent decades, 
more and more lawyers have maintained 
specialty practices.12  Specialization 
means that judges may come from 
private or public sector careers that 
exposed them regularly to only some of 
the ever-expanding constitutional and 
non-constitutional law questions that 
now shape their dockets.  Casual use of 
acronyms and other jargon comes with 
risks because, according to one federal 
district court, writers gamble when they 
“presuppose specialized knowledge on 
the part of their readers.”13     
 Reliance on recognized acronyms, 
like reliance on other professional jar-
gon, may serve a legal writer’s purpose 
when the audience consists solely of 
readers trained in the writer’s specialty. 
But without this foundation of common 
understanding, warns Judge Richard A. 
Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the 7th Circuit, “much legal jargon can 
obscure rather than illuminate a particu-
lar case.”14 
 “There is nothing wrong with a spe-
cialized vocabulary – for use by special-
ists,” Judge Posner explained. “Federal 
district and circuit judges, however, . . . 
are generalists. . . . Lawyers should un-
derstand the judges’ limited knowledge 
of specialized fields and choose their 
vocabulary accordingly.”15 
 Plain English may warrant counsel’s 
particular attention when, as in the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act case, the 
court reviews a federal agency decision. 
Intricate administrative rules and regu-
lations, grounded as they often are in 
sometimes opaque enabling legislation, 
can create labyrinths most effectively 
negotiated by specialists.  In recent 
generations, administrative law has 
grown “extremely complex,”16 so much 
so that Justice Scalia has remarked that 
“[a]dministrative law is not for sis-
sies.”17  
 The practical upshot of administrative 
complexity, according to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, is that 
lawyers regularly immersed in an agen-
cy’s practice may acquire “insights and 
experience denied judges. The subtleties 
. . . encased in jargon and tucked into 
interstices of the administrative scheme, 
may escape us.”18 “It is the responsibili-
ties of the parties to properly educate the 
court,” explains a federal district judge, 
“not of the court to improperly defer to 
an agency decision.”19 
 Because effective written communi-
cation is a two-way street, judges also 
should apply a rule of reason when they 
consider whether to use acronyms in 
lengthy opinions.  Casual use of acro-
nyms may unnecessarily break the read-
ers’ flow because the opinion’s primary 
audience – the lawyers who handle a 
particular case or later seek precedents, 
and the clients whose rights and obliga-
tions hang in the balance – may also not 
be specialists in the field that gives rise 
to the decision.  Justice Elena Kagan is 
right that a court preparing an opinion 
should strive to “figure out how to com-
municate complicated ideas to people 
who know a lot less than you do about 
a certain subject.”20
 
Writing for a General Readership 
 Most legal writing targets a discrete 
audience readily identifiable in advance, 
and early identification may help in-
form the decision whether and when to 
use acronyms in articles, monographs, 
books or other writings that seek to reach 
a general audience beyond the courts. 
An audience of lawyers trained in the 
writer’s specialty may be able to digest 
acronyms more easily than an audience 
of lawyers trained in other specialties, 
or an audience of clients or other lay 
readers unaccustomed to legal discus-
sion altogether.  Analysis that resonates 
with some readers may create barriers 
for others. 
 At its best, writing is a dialog, and 
not a monolog.  Writers may understand 
what they mean to say, but the key is 
whether readers will also understand and 
remain with the text until the end.  When 
a frustrated reader quits in midstream for 
inability or unwillingness to converse 
in acronyms or other unfamiliar jargon, 
the writer fails in the core mission – to 
finish before the reader does.  As stage 
and screen actress Shirley Booth said 
soon after winning an Academy Award 
in 1952, “the audience is 50 percent of 
the performance.”21
Conclusion: Bridging the 
Gap
  In court filings and other expression 
that applies the rule of reason, the sound-
est advice for writers is to err on the side 
of avoiding overreliance on acronyms. 
Unless the writer publishes with greater 
grasp of the subject matter than the aver-
age reader, the writer should not publish 
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at all.  Freewheeling use of acronyms 
can create unnecessary, avoidable road-
blocks that thwart the writer’s effort to 
bridge the gap.
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